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PAVING A NEW (HUA)WEI: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO
SECURING INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAINS
Jordan Villegas+
Recent amendments to Chinese Intelligence Laws codify affirmative
obligations upon domestic companies and citizens alike, namely, that they must
assist and support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its intelligence
gathering efforts. Coupling these laws with the international prevalence of
Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company comprising two-thirds of 5G
equipment outside China, CCP compromised 5G equipment is an unassailable
reality. This article explores five intelligence allied nations and how each has
respectively addressed the risk posed by Huawei. It argues each nation’s policies
are deducible to three primary approaches, categorically including: (1)
promulgation of law explicitly excluding Huawei 5G equipment; (2)
promulgation of law generically improving supply chain risks without any
explicit exclusion of Huawei 5G equipment; and (3) no promulgation nor
undertaken efforts to address 5G supply chain risks. Various external and
domestic factors, including political climates, economic dependencies, and
intragovernmental agreement, heavily influence a nation’s supply chain risk
mitigation efforts. Irrespective of a nation’s approach to supply chain risk
mitigation, this paper deduces that government action, in and of itself, is
insufficient to effectively combat Huawei; it is either incapable of regulating
private industries’ purchases or, if it is capable, regulatory measures are bogged
down by arduous and lengthy procedures such that swift reaction to pervasive
security threats is an impracticable option. Thus, the private industry must play
a role.

+
J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2022; B.A., University of
California, Los Angeles, cum laude, 2019. I would like to thank Lauren Kravetz and Jeffery
Goldthorp for their extensive feedback and guidance on this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
“One basic reality should go undisputed: there is nearly zero daylight between
the communist government of China and its ‘companies.’”1
Studies have highlighted that Chinese actors “are the source of more cyberattacks than in any other country” and “are the world’s most active and persistent
perpetrators of economic espionage.”2 Against this backdrop, “minimiz[ing]
exposure to cyberattacks and espionage” in new technology is vital.3 Shifting

1. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O’RIELLY RE:
CHINA MOBILE INTERNATIONAL (USA) INC., APPLICATION FOR GLOBAL FACILITIES-BASED AND
GLOBAL RESALE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO SECTION
214 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED, ITC-214-20110901-00289
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O’RIELLY].
2. STAFF OF H. PERMANENT SELECT. COMM. ON INTEL., 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE. at 7–8 (Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIVE REPORT].
3. David Stehlin, Insight: Telecom Industry Must Develop Trustworthy 5G Equipment
Supply Chains, TELECOMM. INDUS. ASS’N (Nov. 5, 2019), https://tiaonline.org/insight-telecomindustry-must-develop-trustworthy-5g-equipment-supply-chains/.
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from 4G to 5G technologies creates new issues and vulnerabilities4 because 5G
technology supports “more connected devices and data than ever before.”5
Vulnerabilities and risks introduced by 5G include “malicious
software[,]hardware,” and “counterfeit components.”6 Were these risks
exploited, the consequences would prove detrimental to 5G network security.
Acquiring 5G products usually involves purchasing from one of four major
vendors, each of which provides end-to-end solutions: Huawei Technologies
Co., Ltd (Huawei), Ericsson, Nokia, or Samsung.7 Of these four vendors,
Huawei is “cheape[st] to deploy,” offering equipment at prices nearly 30 percent
lower than its competitors.8 Headquartered in Shenzhen, China, Huawei owns
over two-thirds of 5G equipment outside China,9 making it the largest
telecommunications equipment company in the world.10 Huawei equipment has
been recognized by numerous telecom companies as “good . . . if not better
than—competing equipment from Nokia or Ericsson.”11 Huawei’s widespread
availability, “high-quality,” and competitive pricing make it an enticing option
for suppliers.12 However, global concerns regarding Huawei’s trustworthiness
continue to permeate the international community.

4. Kate O’Flaherty, New 5G Security Threat Sparks Snooping Fears, FORBES (Nov. 13,
2019, 9:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/11/13/new-5g-securitythreats-spark-snooping-fears/?sh=75752ac85025.
5. David Stehlin, Insight: Telecom Industry Must Develop Trustworthy 5G Equipment
Supply Chains, TELECOMM. INDUS. ASS’N (Nov. 5, 2019), https://tiaonline.org/insight-telecomindustry-must-develop-trustworthy-5g-equipment-supply-chains/.
6. 5G Introduces New Benefits, Cybersecurity Risks, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 15,
2020),https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/10/15/feature-article-5gintroduces-new-benefits-cybersecurity-risks.
7. Melanie Hart & Jordan Link, There is a Solution to the Huawei Challenge, CENTER FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 14, 2020), https:/www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2020/10
/14/491476/solutions-huawei-challenge/.
8. Id.
9. Rita Liao, Huawei Says Two-Thirds of 5G Networks Outside China Now Use Its Gear,
TECH CRUNCH (June 25, 2019, 10:01 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/25/huawei-wins-5gcontracts/.
10. Telecommunication Equipment Companies Ranked By Overall Revenue in 2018 (in
Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (July 17, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/314657/top10-telecom-equipment-companies-revenue/; see also, Jason Tan, Huawei Now World’s Largest
Telecom Equipment-Maker, CAIXIN (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:59 PM), https://www.caixinglobal.com/
2018-03-19/huawei-now-worlds-largest-telecom-equipment-maker-101223256.html.
11. Brian Fung, How China’s Huawei took the lead over U.S. companies in 5G technology,
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/us-spatwith-huawei-explained/.
12. Peter Waldman, Sheridan Prasso, & Todd Shields, Another Reason U.S. Fears Huawei:
Its Gear Works and It’s Cheap, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2019),https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-01-24/huawei-stokes-u-s-fear-with-low-cost-networking-gear-that-works. The
chief executive officer and general manager of an Oregon telecommunications company stated,
Huawei “makes high-quality networking gear that it sells to rural telecommunications operators for
20 percent to 30 percent less than its competitors do[;]” accordingly, its equipment has helped
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The People’s Republic of China’s (China) 2017 National Intelligence Law has
raised international governmental concerns regarding Huawei’s allegiance to the
Communist Party of China (CCP).13 Under Chinese intelligence laws, “any
organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence
work according to law.”14 To achieve this, China “may demand . . .
organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and
cooperation.”15 Thus, regardless of whether a Chinese partner company is state
or privately owned, “it will have close and increasingly explicit ties to the
CCP.”16
Telecommunications networks’ supply chains depend heavily on trust;17
therefore, the “[u]se of 5G components manufactured by untrusted companies”
creates a risk that malicious and counterfeit materials will be introduced in a
supply chain.18 With concerns regarding the use of Huawei equipment in critical
infrastructure industries, many U.S. officials have voiced concerns that “the
Chinese government’s ongoing intelligence activities . . . present[] too great of
a risk.”19 A former U.S. National Security Advisor has even considered Huawei
“the ‘number one concern’ for democracy moving forward.”20
“telecom companies provide landlines, mobile services and high-speed data to many of the poorest
and most remote areas in the country.” Id.
13. Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense,
LAWFARE (July 20, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-nationalintelligence-law-defense-offense. The new law places “ill-defined and open-ended new security
obligations and risks not only on U.S. and other foreign citizens doing business or studying in
China, but in particular on their Chinese partners and co-workers.” Id. Most concerningly, the law
has effectively shifted the “balance of [] legal obligations from intelligence ‘defense’ to ‘offense’
–that is, by creating affirmative legal responsibilities for Chinese, and in some cases, foreign
citizens, companies, or organizations operating in China to provide access, cooperation, or support
for Beijing’s intelligence-gathering activities.” Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Arjun Kharpal, Huawei Says It Would Never Hand Data to China’s Government.
Experts Say It Wouldn’t Have a Choice CNBC, (Mar. 4, 2019, 8:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html.
16. CANADIAN SEC. INTEL. SERV., CHINA AND THE AGE OF STRATEGIC RIVALRY:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM AN ACADEMIC OUTREACH WORKSHOP 8 (2018).
17. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
Telecommunications networks are vulnerable to malicious and evolving intrusions or
disruptive activities. A sufficient level of trust, therefore, with both the provider of the
equipment and those performing managed services must exist at all times. . . . If [a
company] cannot be trusted, then the United States and others should question whether
the company should operate within the networks of our critical infrastructure.
Id.
18. CYBER AND INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AND RESILIENCE NOTE, at 1 (2019).
19. China Mobile International (USA) Inc., 34 F.C.C.R. 3361, 13 (2019).
20. Maggie Miller, Huawei Threat ‘No. 1 concern’ Moving Forward, Trump National
Security Adviser says, THE HILL (Nov. 16, 2020, 2:11 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/526165-huawei-threat-no-1-concern-moving-forwardtrump-national-security. The former advisor, Robert O’Brien, expanded on such concern, stating
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This note examines supply chain risk management (SCRM) policies
concerning Huawei and the development of these policies within several nations.
By comparatively examining five member nations of the Fourteen Eyes—a
signals intelligence-sharing group comprised of fourteen nations21—this note
addresses and analyzes varying methodologies and actions taken to address
Huawei risks. The five nations selected for review are the United States (US),
United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Italy, and Germany.
This paper will argue that these five nations can be categorized into three
major information and communications technology supply chain risk
management (ICT SCRM) policy approaches, which stem from the nations’
similar methodologies and shared characteristics. This note focuses on
commonalities in the approaches, although each nation within each category
may exhibit different characteristics. This categorization will explore the pros
and cons of various approaches to ICT SCRM and provide insight for developing
future alternatives. This analysis suggests that to effectively reduce the threat
from Huawei, both government and private industry action are necessary.
Absent industry action, there is a risk that Huawei equipment will not be
excluded from private networks, either because Huawei equipment already
exists in current networks or will be used for developing new networks.
Part I of this paper provides an overview of global ICT supply chains and
narrows into a discussion on Huawei’s role in ICT supply chains and a brief
discussion of the background of Fourteen Eyes. Part II dissects each of the five
selected nations, discussing each nation’s individual approach to securing
domestic ICT supply chains through legal and policy actions to date. Part III
analyzes the five nations by categorizing the nations based on their policy
methodologies, shared characteristics, and political overlays. This section also
discusses the consequences each approach may have on effectively excluding
Huawei equipment from networks and how the private industry is a necessary
component to mitigate the risk Huawei poses. This paper’s ability to engage in
a fulsome discussion of this topic is limited by the amount of publicly available
information, as national security policies and intelligence analysis are often nonpublic or classified. Still, sufficient public sources exist to analyze and arrive at
some conclusions regarding how nations perceive the threat from Huawei and
the likely paths they will take to remediate the threat.

“[i]f you believe in democracy and you’re concerned about our elections, [Huawei is] the number
one concern that we’ve got going forward . . . [because] what China could do with . . . Huawei. . .
[is] ‘really quite scary.’” Id.
21. Sven Taylor, Five Eyes, Nine, Eyes, 14 Eyes-Explained, RESTORE PRIV. (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://restoreprivacy.com/5-eyes-9-eyes-14-eyes.
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I. WHAT ARE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPLY CHAINS, WHAT IS
HUAWEI, AND WHAT IS HUAWEI’S INVOLVEMENT?
A. Information and Communications Technology Global Supply Chains
Defined by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
a “supply chain” is a “set of organizations . . . and resources for creating and
moving a product or service from suppliers . . . to an organizations customers.”22
Information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain risks are
defined as “[r]isks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential
adverse impacts to organizational operations . . . organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.”23
Vulnerabilities in ICT supply chains may result in an insertion of
“counterfeits” and “malicious software and hardware” by actors at many
different points, including equipment manufacturers, network integrators, and
software maintenance representatives.24 Since “[ICT] relies on a complex,
globally distributed, and interconnected supply chain ecosystem . . . consist[ing]
of multiple tiers of outsourcing,”25 securing them is considered a “global
problem.”26 Securing a supply chain requires securing “every individual product
of each individual node[,]” in addition to “correctly integrat[ing each node] with
all other components up and down the production ladder.”27
Commentators have stated that because “severe vulnerabilities exist in global
supply chains,” there is an international consensus “that new ways of tackling
these shortcomings are needed.”28 Methods to achieve this goal are influenced
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-361, IT SUPPLY CHAIN NATIONAL
SECURITY-RELATED AGENCIES NEED TO BETTER ADDRESS RISKS, at 1 n.1 (2012). Information
technology is “any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in
the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display
switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information.” Id.
23. Jon Boyens at el., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800161, SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MGMT PRACS. FOR FED. INFO. SYSTEMS AND ORGS., at 1 n.2 (2015)
[hereinafter NAT’L INST. SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MGMT PRACS.]. A general “supply chain risk” arises
from the probability that “an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or
otherwise subvert . . . an item of supply or a system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise
degrade the function, use, or operation of a system.” ARMED FORCES COMM’N & ELEC. ASS’N
CYBER COMM., SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MGMT AWARENESS (2012) [hereinafter ARMED FORCES
COMM’N].
24. NAT’L INST. SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MGMT PRACS., supra note 23, at 1.
25. Id.
26. ARMED FORCES COMM’N, supra note 23, at 3.
27. D. Shoemaker and C. Wilson, The Weakest Link: The ICT Supply Chain and Information
Warfare, 12 J. INFO. WARFARE 10, 11 (2013).
28. Daniel F. Runde & Sundar R. Ramanujam, Recovery with Resilience: Diversifying Supply
Chains to Reduce Risk in the Global Economy, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., at 2–3 (Sep.
2020), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/production/200904_Ramanujam_
GlobalSupply_v4.pdf.
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by a variety of factors, including governmental structure, the level of “political
interference” in decision-making, and other policy decisions.29 Also relevant
are policies regarding corporate liability and market economics.30
There is no internationally unified approach to ICT SCRM policy. Some
approaches “incentivize and reward corporate collaboration” with governmental
policies, while others “require cooperation [that] directly or indirectly penalize
noncollaboration.”31
Some governments have created more stringent
requirements, such as “legally or politically binding” agreements that would
verify a company’s compliance with governmental policies.32
B. What is Huawei, and What is its Effect on Global ICT Supply Chains?
Huawei was founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a former officer with the
People’s Liberation Army during China’s Cultural Revolution.33 In Huawei’s
early years, the People’s Republic of China’s goal was to ensure the entity could
acquire the “technical know-how from Western firms” to enable it to “muscle
into a market where it previously had no presence.”34 Within just ten years,
Huawei’s annual revenue quadrupled from $18 billion to over $105 billion.35
Huawei’s dominance in the 5G market stems from three major factors:
(1) China provides direct and indirect subsidies—including
guaranteed market share within China and cheap credit from Chinese
state banks—that reduce Huawei’s operational costs, speed time to
market for Huawei’s products, and allow it to price its products well
below prices set by its competitors.
(2) Chinese state banks provide generous financing to Huawei’s
customers on terms most commercial banks cannot match, making
Huawei equipment cheaper to deploy at any price.
(3) Chinese officials interfere in the standardization process at the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to increase Huawei’s

29. Id. at 4.
30. See David Forscey & Herb Lin, ‘Just Say No’ Is Not a Strategy for Supply Chain Security,
LAWFARE (Mar. 25, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/just-say-no-not-strategysupply-chain-security (“[F]or businesses, market realities are an important factor in risk
management decisions.”).
31. Ariel Levite, ICT Supply Chain Integrity: Principles for Governmental and Corporate
Policies, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Oct. 4, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org
/2019/10/04/ict-supply-chain-integrity-principles-for-governmental-and-corporate-policies-pub79974.
32. Id. Because such stringent systems “inevitably sour the prospects of objective and
widespread collaboration[,]” it is infrequently, and unlikely, that such techniques are adopted. Id.
33. Sherisse Pham, US Judge Rejects Huawei Lawsuit Challenging a Ban on its Products,
CNN BUS. (Feb. 19, 2020 11:23 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/19/tech/huawei-us-lawsuitrejected/index.html.
34. Hart & Link, supra note 7.
35. Id.
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share of the emerging global 5G standard, making Huawei equipment
even harder to avoid and setting it up to extend its dominance into 6G
and beyond.36
Over the years, Huawei has been suspected of various forms of malicious
activity. In 2012, for example, the African Union contracted with Huawei to
provide a new “desktop cloud solution” for the Union’s headquarters.37 In 2018,
the African Union discovered its network had been penetrated, and that nightly
for five years, the “organisation’s secrets were being [transferred] on to servers
in Shanghai.”38 While Huawei denies allegations that it intentionally
manufactures its equipment with features which allow it secret access to
networks and information, many believe otherwise.39 U.S. officials claim
Huawei “built equipment that secretly gave the company access to networks
without the knowledge of the carriers.”40 Additionally, a recent FBI report
revealed that Huawei has undertaken efforts to steal U.S. trade secrets and
technologies and even launched a “policy instituting a bonus program to award
employees who obtained confidential information from competitors.”41
Huawei’s equipment comprises over two-thirds of 5G equipment outside of
China.42 With global transitions to 5G networks and minimal options for
vendors, Huawei maintains a large stake in ICT supply chains. However, given
security concerns regarding its efforts to steal secrets and information, the effects
of Huawei’s dominance in ICT global supply chains are likely negative.

36. Id.
37. Angus Grigg, Huawei Linked to Major Data Breach, FIN. REV. (July 12, 2018, 11:00
PM), https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/huawei-linked-to-major-data-breach-20180712h12l84.
38. John Aglionby et al., African Union Accuses China of Hacking, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c26a9214-04f2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. Suggested links
between Huawei equipment and backdoors allowing breaches have been the subject of high-level,
public statements from several individuals, including former U.S. National Security Advisor,
Robert O’Brien. O’Brien asserts evidence shows “Huawei has the capability secretly to access
sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the world[.]” Ishita
Chigilli Palli, US has Evidence of Huawei Backdoor: Report, BANK INFO SEC. (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/us-has-evidence-huawei-backdoor-access-report-a-13718.
39. AGLIONBY ET AL., supra note 38.
40. Palli, supra note 38.
41. DEP’T OF JUST., CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONGLOMERATE HUAWEI AND
SUBSIDIARIES CHARGED IN RACKETEERING CONSPIRACY AND CONSPIRACY TO STEAL TRADE
SECRETS (2020). Huawei faces a 16-count idictment stemming from the “long-running practice of
using fraud and deception to misappropriate sophisticated technology from U.S. counterparts.” Id.
As revealed by the FBI’s investigations, the “misappropriated intellectual property included trade
secret information and copyrighted works, such as source code and user manuals for internet
routers, antenna technology and robot testing technology.” Id.
42. Liao, supra note 9.
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II. VARYING INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO SECURING ICT SUPPLY CHAINS
A. The Fourteen Eyes Intelligence Alliance
Since World War II,43 Britain and the United States have maintained a robust
intelligence-sharing partnership with one another.44 Along with Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, these five nations – the Five Eyes – became a
“multilateral intelligence sharing alliance created by the UKUSA Agreement”45
and serve as the foundation of Western nations’ intelligence sharing.46 Nine
additional nations—comprising the “Fourteen Eyes” in aggregate—serve as
third parties to the Agreement and participate in SIGINT—signals
intelligence—sharing.47 These additional nations include Denmark, France,
Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Spain.48
The Fourteen Eyes continue to play a role in developing international
strategies as evinced by an unnamed, high-ranking U.S. official’s remark “that
‘[c]onsultations “with our allies . . . on how to resolve China’s assertive
international strategy have been frequent and are gathering momentum.’’”49 The
concern has been that “if global networks run on Huawei equipment, Beijing
could use that equipment to gather intelligence . . . and potentially bring down
networks to incapacitate other nations in times of crisis.”50 This paper focuses
on the particular approaches to date of the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, Italy, and Germany.51
1. The United States of America
The United States has taken a multifaceted approach to secure ICT supply
chains. Policy affecting federal government use of Huawei has resulted in

43. Dailey J, The Intelligence Club: A Comparative Look at Five Eyes, 5 J. POL. SCI. PUB.
AFFS. 1, 1 (2017).
44. Braden Couch, Five Eyes: Unblinking, Unmoving, and Out of Control, 45 N.C.J. INT’L L.
25, 29 (2019). During the War, the two nations worked closely together to collect signals
intelligence and intercept the axis powers’ communications. Id. at 31–32; see also Dailey J., supra
note 43, at 1.
45. Richie Koch, What Countries are in the 5 Eyes, 9 Eyes, and 14 Eyes Agreements?,
PROTONVPN (Aug. 30, 2018), https://protonvpn.com/blog/5-eyes-global-surveillance/; see also
Couch, supra note 44, at 26–27.
46. Koch, supra note 45.
47. Id. While these fourteen parties trade raw data, akin to the primary five nations, the
fourteen nations have less access to certain resources, such as the NSA’s database. Id.
48. Sven Taylor, Five Eyes, Nine Eyes, 14 Eyes-Explained, RESTORE PRIV. (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://restoreprivacy.com/5-eyes-9-eyes-14-eyes/.
49. Couch, supra note 44, at 33 (alteration in original).
50. Hart & Link, supra note 7.
51. See, e.g., Huawei in 5G: Where Do Other Five Eyes Countries Stand?, FORCES NET (Jan.
28, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.forces.net/news/huawei-5g-where-do-other-five-eyes-countriesstand (discussing the several approaches adopted by various nations with respect to exclusionary
policies which target Huawei).
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excluding Huawei equipment from government networks. Additionally,
government policy has begun affecting private consumers by conditioning
certain government benefits on complying with exclusions of Huawei
equipment. The government has been consistent with its approach towards
Huawei in executive, legislative, and regulatory policy.
In 2013, President Obama promulgated Executive Order 13636, “Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,”52 designed to improve the cybersecurity
of select entities and critical infrastructure as “cybersecurity incident[s] could .
. . result in catastrophic regional or national effects on . . . national security.”53
Although the order directed NIST to develop “a framework to reduce cyber risks
to critical infrastructure,” it did not directly address supply chains or any specific
actor.54 Commenters opined that the Obama Administration seemed to come to
the “defence of Huawei’s business practices, corporate governance and intent in
expanding its U.S. investments.”55
The Trump Administration took a much tougher stance. In 2019, President
Trump signed Executive Order 13873, “Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,”56 declaring ICT
supply chains a matter of “national emergency,” and characterizing the concerns
as an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security . . . of the United
States.”57 The Executive Order prohibits “any acquisition, importation, transfer,
installation, dealing in, or use of any information and communications
technology or service (transaction) by any person . . . where the transaction
involves any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest.”58 It also delegates large roles to the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence in how to move
forward with determining and executing ways to better secure US supply
chains.59 Although President Trump’s Executive Order did not specifically label
Huawei, the release of the Executive Order occurred on the heels of “months of

52. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
53. Id.; see also TARA BEENY ET AL., SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES FROM CHINA IN U.S.
FEDERAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, at 9 (Apr. 2018).
54. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 19, 2013); BEENY ET AL., supra note
53, at 9.
55. Simon Montlake, U.S. Congress Flags China’s Huawei, ZTE As Security Threats,
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2012, 12:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonmontlake/2012/10/08/u-scongress-flags-chinas-huawei-zte-as-security-threats/#525b8e8d784a.
56. Exec. Order No. 13873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22689 (May 15, 2019).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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U.S. pressure on Huawei”60 and at the same time as other actions directed at
China.61
Pursuant to delegated authority, several executive agencies implemented
policies—through standard rulemaking procedures62—consistent with the
Administration’s move to secure ICT supply chains, with some focusing on
Huawei.63 The Bureau of Industry and Security, a sub-agency of the Department
of Commerce (DoC), “restricted access by Huawei . . . and its non-U.S. affiliates
on the Entity List to items produced domestically and abroad from US
technology and software.”64 The Entity List was originally established as an
effort to “inform the public of entities who have engaged in activities”
threatening or posing risks to various matters, such as weapons of mass
destruction programs.65 Since then, the Entity List has been developed and
expanded to include entities with “activities contrary to U.S. national security
and/or foreign policy interests.”66 The National Telecommunications and

60. Frank Bajak & Tali Arbel, Huawei Hit by US Export Controls, Potential Import Ban, AP
(May 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/97e72ba36d814c63ad0325688963a9d9.
61. Examples of this include the ongoing war on trade with China, President Trump urging
the United Nations to “‘hold China accountable’ for the coronavirus pandemic,” and President
Trump’s recent executive order banning transactions and activities with eight Chinese companies.
Amanda Macias, Trump Urges UN to Hold China Accountable for the Coronavirus Pandemic,
CNBC (Sep. 22, 2020, 1:40PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/22/trump-urges-un-to-holdchina-accountable-for-coronavirus-pandemic.html; see also Ryan Hass & Abraham Denmark,
More Pain than Gain: How the US-China Trade War Hurt America, BROOKINGS (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/07/more-pain-than-gain-how-the-uschina-trade-war-hurt-america/; Andrew Shoyer et. al., Trump Executive Order Blocks Transactions
With Certain Chinese Software Applications, DATA MATTERS (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://datamatters.sidley.com/trump-executive-order-blocks-transactions-with-certain-chinesesoftware-applications.
62. See Rules Affecting the Export Administration Regulations, BUREAU INDUS. & SEC.,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/federal-register-notices/17-regulations/1541-federal-registernotices-2019; 15 C.F.R. § 744 (2019); 85 Fed. Reg. 41,006 (2020); 41 C.F.R. § 201 (2020).
63. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice pressed charges against Huawei and several
of its subsidiaries, alleging that Huawei stole “trade secrets, misled banks about its business[,] and
violated U.S. sanctions on Iran.” Bajak & Arbel, supra note 60. Another example of this is
exhibited by the U.S. Department of Energy’s decision to prevent electric utility companies from
purchasing Chinese equipment. Sonal Patel, DOE Bans Utility Procurement of Chinese Equipment
for Bulk Power System Security, POWER MAG. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.powermag.com/doebans-utility-procurement-of-chinese-equipment-for-bulk-power-system-security/.
64. U.S. DEP’T COMM., COMMERCE DEPARTMENT FURTHER RESTRICTS HUAWEI ACCESS
TO U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND ADDS ANOTHER 38 AFFILIATES TO THE ENTITY LIST (Aug. 17, 2020).
The Department of Commerce defines its entity list as being comprised of “license requirements
that it imposes on each listed person.” Entity List, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC. (last visited Jan. 15,
2021), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list.
The original purposes of the Department publishing an entity list was to “inform the public of
entities who have engaged in activities that could result in an increased risk of the diversion of
exported . . . items to weapons of mass destruction.” Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Information Administration (NTIA), also a DoC sub-agency, established the
Communications Supply Chain Risk Information Partnership (C-SCRIP),67
which is designed to “share supply chain risk information with trusted
communications providers and suppliers.”68 Another executive effort is
illustrated by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) creation of a SCRM task force.69 The
task force has multiple working groups comprised of both government and nongovernment participants and works to address various aspects of the supply
chain process.70
a. Restrictions on Use of Huawei in U.S. Government Networks
Under Title II of the SECURE Technology Act, the Federal Acquisition
Supply Chain Security Act of 2018 “established in the executive branch a
Federal Acquisition Security Council” (FASC).71 FASC’s purpose is to create
recommendations and criteria for information sharing “with executive agencies,
other Federal entities, and non-Federal entities with respect to supply chain
risk.”72 The head of each executive agency is responsible for an array of duties
relating to assessing, prioritizing, and integrating supply chain risk practices to
limit, avoid, and mitigate identified risks.73 These duties “bolster[] the U.S.
government’s acquisition oversight for critical information and communications
technologies.”74 By requiring each department and agency to have a SCRM

67. 85 Fed. Reg. 41006 (July 8, 2020).
68. NTIA Announces Supply Chain Information-Sharing Program, NAT’L TELECOMM. INFO
ADMIN U.S. DEPT. OF COM. (July 8, 2020), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2020/ntia-announcessupply-chain-information-sharing-program.
69. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE: INTERIM
REPORT iii (2019).
70. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk Management
(SCRM)
Task
Force,
CYBERSECURITY
&
INFRASTRUCTURE
SEC.
AGENCY,
https://www.cisa.gov/ict-scrm-task-force; CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY,
supra note 69, at 4. The four working groups cover information sharing, understanding and
evaluating supply chain threats, identifying criteria for Qualified Manufacturers, and
recommendations for policies regarding ICT purchasing. Id.
71. SECURE Technology Act, 41 U.S.C. §1322(a). Members of FASC are to include the
Office of Management and Budget, General Services Administration, Department of Homeland
Security (including Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency), Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
Department of Defense (including the National Security Agency), and the Department of
Commerce (including National Institute of Standards and Technology). Id. at §1322(b)(1).
72. Id. at § 1323(a)(2); 41 C.F.R. § 201 (2020). Additionally, FASC is tasked with developing
criteria in “[d]etermining the risk to the ICT supply chain[,] [d]isseminating supply chain risk
information, and [d]eciding what action to take to mitigate the risk.” FED. ACQUISITION SEC.
COUNCIL, SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (2018).
73. 41 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)–(b).
74. FED. ACQUISITION SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 72.
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program, FASC promotes the development of uniform criteria for SCRM,75
which in turn “arms departments and agencies with [] knowledge” regarding
supply chain risks.76
Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 prohibited “executive agencies from entering
into, or extending or renewing, a contract with an entity that uses any equipment,
system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services
as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology
as part of any system.”77 The act, in pertinent parts, defines “covered foreign
country [as] the People’s Republic of China”78 and “covered
telecommunications equipment or services” as including “[t]elecommunications
equipment produced by Huawei Technologies . . . or any subsidiary or affiliate
of such.”79
In an interim rule, published by the General Services Administration,
Department of Defense, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
amendments to Federal Acquisition Regulations were planned to facilitate
implementation of Section 889(a)(1)(B).80 This would apply to the use of
covered telecommunications equipment by both the Federal Government and
federal contractors in order to avoid any ultimate disruption or delay in the
Federal Government’s operations.81
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No.
115–232, § 889(a)(1)(B), 132 Stat. 1636, 1917 (2018); 85 Fed. Reg. 135 (2020). In March of 2019,
Huawei filed suit against the US government, challenging the constitutionality of NDAA’s Section
889. Huawei Sues US Government Over Product Ban, BBC NEWS (Mar 7, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47478587. Huawei argued that, first, the Congressional bill
was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, which legislatively punished Huawei without it first being
given a fair trial; and second, the bill would restrict Huawei from “engaging in fair competition.”
Id.; Huawei Sues US Over Equipment Ban, Escalating Legal Clash, INDUS. WK. (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.industryweek.com/leadership/article/22027272/huawei-sues-us-over-equipment-banescalating-legal-clash. By February of 2020, a U.S. District Judge ruled in favor of the U.S.,
holding that Congress has the “power to restrict federal agencies from doing business with Huawei
and ZTE . . . [c]ontracting with the federal government is a privilege, not a constitutionally
guaranteed right.” Pham, supra note 33. The judge also noted that Huawei faced no broad
restrictions on its business endeavors in the US, given that it could “still conduct business with
every other company and individual in America as well as the remaining 169 countries and regions
it currently does business with.” Id.
78. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No.
115–232, § 889(f)(2), 132 Stat. 1636, 1918 (2018).
79. Id. at § 889(f)(3)(A).
80. Sean Graves & Suzanne Sumner, Updated Rule Bans Federal Contractor Use of Huawei
and Other Telecommunication Technology, LEXOLOGY (July 22, 2020), https://www.lexology.com
/library/detail.aspx?g=da6d8c76-df81-4360-9023-c4d6f9ebbc7c.
81. Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Contracting With Entities Using Certain
Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, 85 Fed. Reg. 42665 (July 14,
2020).
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b. Restrictions on Use of Huawei Affecting Private Consumers
Pursuant to Section 3 of the SECURE Technology Act, the Federal
Communication Commission’s (FCC) Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau (PSHSB), acting on delegated authority from the Commission, made
initial and final designations of Huawei as a “national security threat.”82 Citing
Huawei, and another prominent Chinese telecommunications company ZTE, as
“a unique threat,” PSHSB explained the threat posed “to the security and
integrity of the nation’s communications networks and communications supply
chain because of their size, their close ties to the Chinese government, and the
security flaws identified in their equipment.”83 Designating Huawei as a
national security threat enabled the FCC, following the standard notice and
comment rulemaking process, to forbid private entities who were receiving
subsidies through the Universal Service Fund (USF) program from using those
funds to purchase equipment from designated national security threat entities,
like Huawei.84 Additionally, the FCC introduced a “rip and replace” order,
which offers subsidies to smaller telecom carriers to remove and replace Huawei
equipment.85 Estimated costs of this process, however, are substantial—roughly
$1.6 billion.86
In December 2017, before the FCC designated Huawei as a national security
threat, members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives intelligence
committees sent the FCC a letter, noting their concerns about Chinese companies
in telecommunications networks.87 Commentators have speculated that this
letter pressured AT&T—a dominant US telecommunications carrier—to
withdraw from a planned smartphone deal with Huawei.88 As a consequence of
the withdrawal, it has become “very difficult for Huawei to get significant

82. Protecting Against Nat’l Sec. Threats to the Commc’ns Supply Chain through FCC
Programs Huawei Designation ZTE Designation, 34 FCC Rcd. 11423, 11424 (2019); Protecting
Against Nat’l Sec. Threats to the Commc’ns Supply Chain through FCC Programs – Huawei
Designation, 35 FCC Rcd. 6604, 6604 (2020); see also 47 C.F.R. § 54.9(b) (2020).
83. Protecting Against Nat’l Sec. Threats to the Commc’ns Supply Chain through FCC
Programs – Huawei Designation, 35 FCC Rcd. at 6605.
84. Protecting Against Nat’l Sec. Threats to the Commc’ns Supply Chain through FCC
Programs Huawei Designation ZTE Designation, 34 FCC Rcd. at 11424.
85. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, WC DOCKET NO. 18-89, PROTECTING AGAINST NATIONAL
SECURITY THREATS TO THE COMMUNICATION SUPPLY THROUGH FCC PROGRAMS (2020)
(hereinafter “SECOND REPORT AND ORDER”).
86. Sarah Barry James, FCC Approves Telecom Equipment Rip-and-Replace Order Covering
Huawei, ZTE, SPGLOBAL (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/latest-news-headlines/fcc-approves-telecom-equipment-rip-and-replace-order-coveringhuawei-zte-61689729.
87. Sijia Jiang, Huawei’s AT&T U.S. Smartphone Deal Collapses, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2018,
4:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-at-t-huawei-tech/huaweis-att-u-s-smartphone-deal-collapsesidUSKBN1EX29E.
88. Id.
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[market shares] in the U.S.”89 Following AT&T’s decision, Verizon—another
prominent US carrier—dropped its plans to sell Huawei phones.90
c. Other U.S. Government Attempts to Reduce the Prevalence of Huawei
The recent NDAA FY21, passed by Congress over a Presidential veto,
included the “Wireless Supply Chain Innovation and Multilateral Security,”91
“direct[ing] the [NTIA] to begin issuing competitive grants . . . that promote”
and “enhance competitiveness in the supply chains of Open RAN 5G
Networks.”92 Section 9202(a) grants security funding for communications
technology and permits funds to “[a]ccelerat[e] commercial deployments of
open interface standards-based compatible, interoperable equipment . . . such as
the O-RAN Alliance [or] the Open-RAN Software Community.”93 “OpenRAN” is defined as “the Open Radio Access Network approach to
standardization adopted by the O-RAN Alliance.”94 As a concept, Open RAN
“creates standardized and interoperable interfaces between systems in the radio
access network[,]” which would substitute for traditional telecommunication
networks interfaces that are “either proprietary or optimized by the individual
vendor, and are often tied to the underlying hardware layer.”95 Thus, opening
interfaces with Open RAN would provide operators the opportunity to “integrate
components from a variety of vendors” and enable companies in the telecom
industry to “specialize in sub-components rather than end-to-end solutions.”96

89. Id.
90. Rachel England, Verizon Follows AT&T in Dropping Huawei Smartphones, ENGADGET
(Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.engadget.com/2018-01-30-verizon-follows-atandt-in-dropping-huaweismartphones.html. Some commentators have speculated that Verizon’s decision to exclude Huawei
resulted from the pressure it felt once AT&T decided to exclude Huawei. Id.
91. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388
§ 9202.
92. Ron Westfall, Open RAN 5G Bill: Congress Ups 5G Stakes with Passage of $750 Million
Open RAN 5G Bill, FUTURUM (Nov. 23, 2020), https://futurumresearch.com/research-notes/openran-5g-bill-congress-ups-5g-stakes-with-passage-of-750-million-open-ran-5g-bill/.
The bill was unanimously passed by the House of Representatives and aimed to target $750 million
in funding to help spur Open RAN industry developments. Id.
93. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. 116-283, 134
Stat. 3388 § 9202(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2021). This bill also sets up a “Multilateral Telecommunications
Security Fund to support the development and adoption of secure and trusted telecommunications
technologies.” Id. § 9202(a)(2)(B).
94. Id. § 9202(b)(5).
95. Melissa K. Griffith, Open RAN and 5G: Looking Beyond the National Security Hype,
WILSON CTR. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/open-ran-and-5g-lookingbeyond-national-security-hype. Commentators have opined that Open RAN has received much
attention because the concept has “been framed as a national security imperative and an important
tool for keeping untrusted vendors (namely Huawei and ZTE) out of 5G networks at home and
abroad.” Id.
96. Id.
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“[A]dvocates for Open RAN claim” the diversity and innovation of the system
“will muscle out Chinese companies like Huawei whose relative advantage is in
providing proprietary, vertically integrated networks at low cost.”97 In addition,
“U.S. policy makers view Open RAN as an avenue for U.S.-based 5G suppliers
to compete more effectively against China-based supplier[] Huawei.”98
Overall, the United States is engaging in a “‘whole of government’ approach”
to minimize Huawei’s presence in ICT supply chains, citing Huawei as a
national security concern. Executive, legislative, and regulatory actions are
chipping away at Huawei’s access both to the substantial amount of equipment
and services purchased by the federal government and services purchased by
providers for businesses and consumers.99
2. The United Kingdom
As of late 2021, the UK has no ICT SCRM policy targeting Huawei that
carries the force of law. However, the UK is on track to imitate the US’s efforts
through pending legislation in the House of Commons. If passed, the legislation
would echo that of the US by designating Huawei as a national security threat.
UK’s policy on Huawei shifted in 2020, from originally permitting the
equipment in certain communications networks to excluding its equipment
completely. This policy shift was concurrent with the deterioration of political
relations between the UK and China. Government officials’ stances and
statements in the UK mirror the domestic shifts, indicating a tougher, more
stringent position on Huawei. Overall, UK’s ICT SCRM proposed legislation
targets Huawei explicitly rather than targeting national security threats and
envisions a framework that would curtail the use of Huawei products.

97. Id. In October of 2020, under leadership by former Chairman Ajit Pai, the Federal
Communications Commission hosted an event on Open RAN technologies. Id. During this event,
much attention was given to the economic benefits brought by Open RAN, and to the security
implications associated with the presence of Chinese equipment in 5G networks. Id. This event
received much attention in both the government and private industries, as a keynote speaker of this
event was former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, who stressed that Open RAN is a “crucial tool
for ‘addressing the China challenge’ the U.S. now faces.” Id. This intragovernmental appearance
from a key executive member at an independent regulatory event emphasizes “the recent
geopolitical weight that has been given to Open RAN in the U.S.” Id.
98. Westfall, supra note 92.
99. Laura H. Phillips et al., Current “Whole of Government” Approach to Perceived National
Security Risks from Chinese Technology Reflected in the FCC’s Latest Universal Service Fund
Order
FAEGRE
DRINKER
(Dec.
4,
2019),
https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2019/12/current-whole-of-governmentapproach-to-perceived-national-security-risks-from-chinese-technology-__?utm_source=Drinker_
Communications&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=Current-Whole-of-GovernmentApproach-to-Perceived-National-Security-Risks-from-Chinese-Technology-Reflected-in-theFCCs-Latest-Universal-Service-Fund-Order (discussing the U.S.’s combined government efforts
via FCC action to unanimously ban Huawei from all projects funded by the Universal Service
Fund).
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The UK’s approach to securing ICT supply chains can be characterized as one
of patchwork. A July 2019 “UK Telecoms Supply Chain Review Report,”
issued to Parliament by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport,
stated that the government was “not yet in a position to make a final decision on
individual high risk vendors and the additional controls that will be applied to
them.”100 The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament stated that the
effects of this delay were beginning to “caus[e] serious damage to [their]
international relationships” and because of this, “a decision [needed to] be made
as a matter of urgency.”101 The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media &
Sport stated that the UK would “legislate to put the telecoms security
requirements on a statutory footing, strengthen the powers of the regulator . . .
to enforce the security requirements, and provide new national security powers
for government to respond to supply chain risks in the future.”102
In January 2020, Prime Minister (PM) Boris Johnson permitted “‘high-risk
vendors’ such as Huawei . . . in[] the non-sensitive parts of the 5G network[,]”
at a cap of 35 percent.103 High-risk vendors were excluded from sensitive core
and critical networks.104 Britain defended this position, claiming Five Eyes
intelligence-sharing would not be jeopardized, as there is a fundamental
difference between constructing 5G and sharing classified data.105 This stance
remained the UK’s position until July 14, 2020.106
In mid-July, following a meeting of the U.K. National Security Council, PM
Johnson announced his decision to restrict Huawei from 5G telecom networks
and to remove Huawei equipment from current systems by 2027.107 The U.K.

100. DEP’T FOR DIGIT., CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, UK TELECOMS SUPPLY CHAIN REVIEW
REPORT
7
(2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/819469/CCS001_CCS0719559014-001_Telecoms_Security_and_
Resilience_Accessible.pdf.
101. INTEL. AND SEC. COMM. OF PARLIAMENT, STATEMENT ON 5G SUPPLIERS,
https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20190719_ISC_Statement_5G
Suppliers_Web.pdf.
102. DEP’T FOR DIGIT., CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, supra note 100, at 1.
103. Paul Sandle & Jack Stubbs, Defying Trump, UK’s Johnson Refuses to Ban Huawei 5G,
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2020, 7:38 PM), https://fr.reuters.com/article/us-britain-usa-huaweiidUSKBN1ZR02G. Former U.S. White House National Security Council Senior Director, Tim
Morrison, emphasized “[i]f Huawei is allowed into any part of your network, it is allowed into
every part of your network.” Id. A separate Trump administration official also stated, relatedly,
that “[t]here is no safe option for untrusted vendors to control any part of a 5G network.” Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Stuart Seidel, US-UK to Remove Huawei from UK 5G Networks by 2027, Bans Huawei
from Supplying New 5G Equipment, BAKER MCKENZIE (July 17, 2020), https://www.international
tradecomplianceupdate.com/2020/07/17/us-uk-to-remove-huawei-from-uk-5g-networks-by-2027bans-huawei-from-supplying-new-5g-equipment/.
107. Id.
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Secretary of State claimed the change in course as a result of the significantly
different landscape following the US’s sanctions on Huawei.108 He stated his
uncertainty regarding Huawei’s presence in the supply chain and that “the UK
[could] no longer be confident it [could] guarantee the security of future Huawei
5G equipment.”109 Additionally, Parliament’s Defence Committee reported a
finding of “clear evidence” that Huawei “colluded with the Chinese state,”
prompting it to adopt the position that the UK “may need to remove all Huawei
equipment earlier than planned.”110
Timing of the UK’s shift correlates with the increasing tension between the
UK and China over China’s actions in Hong Kong.111 On June 30, 2020, the
implementation of China’s new National Security law in Hong Kong severed
the territorial agreement between the UK and China, under which China was not
yet to effectuate the CCP within Hong Kong.112 As tensions rose, the UK
announced its decision to ban Huawei from U.K. communications networks two
weeks before the official severance.113
Concurrent with the announcement that Huawei equipment and services
would be banned from U.K. communications networks, a new Telecoms
(Security) Bill, which would amend the U.K.’s Communications Act 2003, was
under consideration.114 The new bill “plac[es] strengthened telecoms security
duties on telecoms providers, [and] provid[es] new powers for the government

This announcement, appearing in a Press Release issued by both the Department for Digital,
Culture, Media & Sport and the National Cyber Security Centre, stated there was to “be a ban on
the purchase of new Huawei kit[s] for 5G” and that Huawei equipment “will be completely removed
from 5G networks by the end of 2027.” Huawei to be removed from UK 5G networks by 2027
(July 14, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/huawei-to-be-removed-from-uk-5gnetworks-by-2027.
108. Hadas Gold, UK Bans Huawei From its 5G Network in Rapid About-Face, CNN BUS.
(July 14, 2020, 1:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/14/tech/huawei-uk-ban/index.html.
109. Id.
110. UK Parliament Committee says Huawei Colludes with the Chinese State, REUTERS (Oct.
8, 2020, 3:46 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-huawei/uk-parliament-committee-says-huaweicolludes-with-the-chinese-state-idUSKBN26T144.
111. See Hilton Yip, China’s Surging Nationalism Has Claimed Hong Kong, FOREIGN POL’Y
(May 28, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/hong-kong-nationalism-chinasecurity-law-protests/.
112. Id. In effect, the law eviscerates “Hong Kong’s autonomy under the ‘one country, two
systems’ arrangement that has been in place since 1997.” Id.
113. Id.
114. See Factsheet 2: New Telecoms Security Framework (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/telecommunications-security-bill
factsheets/factsheet-2-new-tele
coms-security-framework. Acknowledging the “lack of incentives for telecoms providers to apply
security best practices” and the “tensions between commercial priorities and commercial concerns,”
the UK government introduced a new telecoms security framework through the
Telecommunications (Security) Bill which “imposes new statutory duties and requirements for the
UK’s public telecoms providers.” Id.
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to set out specific security requirements.”115 At the time of writing this article,
the bill had passed the House of Commons stages and was set for its third and
final reading in the House of Lords in late 2021 through early 2022.116 This bill
will introduce a stronger telecoms security framework by “placing strengthened
telecoms security duties on public telecoms providers” and “introduc[ing] new
national security powers for the government to manage risks posed by high risk
vendors.”117 The bill also “places new obligations on public telecoms service
providers to share information with Ofcom [the telecom regulator] that is
necessary to assess the security of their networks” and “introduces financial
penalties for non-compliance.”118 Lastly, “[t]he Bill creates new powers for the
Secretary of State to designate vendors for the purpose of . . . imposing controls
on [public communications providers’] use of those designated vendors’
goods.”119 This designation occurs only when the Secretary deems it “necessary
in the interests of national security.”120
While the bill has not yet become law and no other legislation or regulatory
actions have limited the use of Huawei equipment or services in the U.K.
communications network, the UK has taken non-legislative measures to
recommend ICT SCRM practices that would exclude Huawei equipment. Chief
among these actions is the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report
identifying Huawei by name and offering recommendations for risk mitigation
security practices.121 NCSC is “the national technical authority for information
assurance and the lead Government operational agency on cyber security,”122
which is part of the Government Communications Headquarters, and “acts as a
bridge between industry and government, providing a unified source of advice,
guidance and support on cyber security.”123 The NCSC’s original January 28,

115. Id.
116. Telecommunications
(Security)
Act
2021,
c.
31
(UK),
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/2806). After the third reading in the House of Lords, it passes to its
final stages of “consideration of amendments” and “royal assent.” Id.
117. Factsheet 1: Overview (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/telecommunications-security-billfactsheets/factsheet-1-overview.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. NCSC Advice on the Use of Equipment from High Risk Vendors in UK Telecoms
Networks, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR. (July 14, 2020), https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/ncscadvice-on-the-use-of-equipment-from-high-risk-vendors-in-uk-telecoms-networks.
122. HUAWEI CYBER SECURITY EVALUATION CENTRE (HCSEC) OVERSIGHT BOARD
ANNUAL REPORT 2020: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM (2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/923309/Huawei_Cyber_Security_Evaluation_Centre__HCSEC__Oversight_
Board-_annual_report_2020.pdf (hereinafter “HCSEC OVERSIGHT ANNUAL REPORT 2020”).
123. NCSC (National Cyber Security Centre) (last visited Mar. 13, 2022),
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-cyber-security-centre.

642

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:623

2020 report did not go as far as to specifically identify Huawei, but the July 14,
2020 update, which came after the release of the U.S. Entity List, did.124
Reflecting the UK’s shift towards tougher policies on Huawei, the Huawei
Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) Oversight Board issued a 2020
annual report to the National Security Adviser of the UK.125 HCSEC, belonging
to Huawei Technologies, was founded in 2010 to serve as a liaison between
Huawei and Her Majesty’s Government to identify and mitigate risks arising in
the UK’s critical national infrastructure.126 The 2020 report raised issues
regarding Huawei’s “poor coding practices” as it continues to fail to follow “its
own internal secure coding guidelines.”127
While UK law is undergoing review and finalization, private telecom
companies, in the meantime, have discovered alternative vendors and solutions
to Huawei. One example of this occurred in November 2020 when Vodafone, a
British mobile operator, announced it would not be contracting with Huawei but
instead would explore alternative technology, such as Open RAN.128 Switching
to Open RAN, even without the UK’s legislation officially in place, indicates
the hesitance of private telecom operators to voluntarily continue using Huawei
equipment.
In sum, the UK’s shift to prohibiting Huawei products in U.K.
communications networks, coupled with assessments in Parliament and other
oversight boards, reflects the UK’s decreasing tolerance for Huawei equipment
124. NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR., supra note 121. The July update echoed the U.S.’s approach
toward Huawei, addressing the following factors:
(a) Huawei has a significant market share in the UK already, which gives it a strategic
significance; (b) It is a Chinese company that could, under China’s National
IntelligenceLaw of 2017, be ordered to act in a way that is harmful to the UK; (c) We
assess that the Chinese State (and associated actors) have carried outand will continue
to carry out cyber attacks against the UK and our interests; (d) Our experience has
shown that Huawei’s cyber security and engineeringquality is low and its processes
opaque. . .; and (e) A large number of Huawei entities have been included on the US
Entity listfor over 12 months now.
Id.
125. HCSEC OVERSIGHT ANNUAL REPORT 2020, supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. Id. The 2020 report stated, because Huawei failed to address and assess the security risks
raised by NCSC in its previous report, the UK was left exposed to such risks. Id. Causes of these
risks were considered ongoing, but inclusive of the following:
Huawei had inadequate component management and did not align end-of-life dates of
components with end-of-life date of products. Furthermore, Huawei did not identify
the issue themselves. Once identified by NCSC, Huawei did not remediate the issue
promptly. It took 18 months for network remediation to begin.Remediation of
nationally distributed access networks, including productreplacement where necessary,
takes time and is resource intensive. The issue has been compounded by Huawei being
placed on the U.S.Entity List.
Id.
128. Joe Devanesan, Is OpenRAN the 5G Alternative to Huawei?, TECHHQ, (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://techhq.com/2020/11/is-openran-the-5g-alternative-to-huawei/.
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in 5G deployment. This shift is reflected through both the recent proposal of the
Telecoms Bill and through the independent actions of private industry. Though
the legislation remains pending, the U.K. appears credible in prohibiting all
Huawei products in the near future.
3. Canada
Canada has not adopted a law or policy to restrict Huawei equipment.
Canada’s action in ICT SCRM policy has been limited and inconsistent
throughout its governance. While some agencies of the Canadian government
have produced guidance documents and action plans for ICT SCRM, none
approach a level of detail capable of restricting products from any specific entity.
Furthermore, Canadian government officials have not indicated, neither through
public statements nor policy proposals, any government plan to secure supply
chains. Commentators opine that the silence from high-level officials and the
government is indicative of a “do nothing” approach to securing supply
chains.129
Some attribute the silence to the fact that Canadian intelligence does not have
any “cabinet committee dedicated exclusively to S&I [Security and Intelligence]
. . . [nor] parliamentary oversight mechanism which can consistently monitor the
[intelligence] community.”130 Consistent with this state of affairs, Canada
remains the only Five Eyes member to neither ban nor restrict usage of Huawei
5G equipment in its domestic networks.131
Canada recently adopted a comprehensive approach to coordinated national
security policy. Public Safety Canada (Public Safety) was established “in 2003
to ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible
for national security and the safety of Canadians.”132 Public Safety’s Minister,
Ralph Goodale, claims the agency is currently examining, “with a great deal of
care[,]” the security and technical issues involved, and assures, their final
decisions “will not compromise [their] national security.”133
The department adopted a Cyber Security Strategy 2018 and, in 2019, released
a 2019-2024 National Cyber Security Action Plan (Action Plan), which
recognized that, for the future innovation and prosperity of Canada, there was a

129. Tom Jowitt, Canada To Be Final ‘Five Eyes’ Member to Exclude Huawei – Report,
SILICON (Aug. 26, 2020, 11:34 AM), https://www.silicon.co.uk/5g/canada-exclude-huawei347312#:~:text=Five%20Eyes%20Ban,5G%20equipment%20in%20that%20ban.
130. Dailey, supra note 43, at 4.
131. Robert Fife, et al., Canada is now the Only Five Eyes Member to not Ban or Restrict use
of Huawei 5G Equipment, GLOBE & MAIL (July 15, 2020), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
politics/article-canada-now-only-member-of-five-eyes-alliance-to-have-not-banned-huawei/.
132. About Public Safety Canada, (last visited Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.publicsafety.gc.
ca/cnt/bt/index-en.aspx.
133. Marrian Zhou, Canadian Ban on Huawei’s 5G Tech will Trigger ‘Repercussions,’ says
China, CNET (Jan. 18, 2019, 12:11 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/canadian-ban-on-huaweis-5gtech-will-trigger-repercussions-says-china/.

644

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:623

robust need for improved cyber security.134 This Action Plan was to serve as a
“blueprint for the implementation of [Canada’s 2018] Strategy.”135 The 2018
Strategy addressed Canada’s move toward greater cyber security measures by
discussing new funding for the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber
Centre) and the creation of the National Cybercrime Coordination Unit.136 The
Plan, however, like the 2018 Strategy, lacks any discussion on mitigating threats
to ICT supply chains.137
The Cyber Centre was established in 2018, within the Communications
Security Establishment (CSE), by Canada in an attempt to coordinate cyber
security expertise and offer guidance and support on cyber security for the
private and public sectors.138 Cyber Centre “leads the government’s response to
cyber security events [and] work[s] to protect and defend the country’s valuable
cyber assets[,]” serving as “Canada’s authority on cyber security.”139 In 2018,
it released a “National Cyber Threat Assessment,” which stated efforts would be
taken to “help[] mitigate supply chain threats to the telecommunications
sector.”140 On closer examination, this assessment was only a set of broad
conclusions that did not suggest any substantive methodologies to address ICT
SCRM or indicate that any were forthcoming.141
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) “is at the forefront of
Canada’s national security system” with the authority to “take measures to
reduce threats to” and investigate “activities suspected of constituting threats to
the security of Canada.”142 While CSIS has reportedly pushed for Huawei’s ban
from Canadian infrastructure, the group has not released formal documentation
regarding this stance.143 The only public statement related to security concerns
emanates from an academic outreach workshop—”China and the Age of

134. PUB. SAFETY CAN., NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY ACTION PLAN 2019-2024, 3–4,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-cbr-scrt-strtg-2019/ntnl-cbr-scrt-strtg-2019en.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Id. at II–III.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 20–21; About the Cyber Centre (last visited Nov. 12, 2020),
https://cyber.gc.ca/en/about-cyber-centre. The Communications Security Establishment is a
member of Canada’s security and intelligence community, which provides the Government with
information technology security and foreign signals intelligence services. About Us, COMMC’NS
SEC. ESTABLISHMENT (last visited Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/about-apropos.
139. About the Cyber Centre, supra note 138.
140. National Cyber Threat Assessment 2018, CAN. CTR. FOR CYBER SEC. (last visited Nov.
12, 2020), https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/national-cyber-threat-assessment2018-supply-chain-e.pdf.
141. Id.
142. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, (last visited Nov. 12, 2020)
https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service.html.
143. See Roger Jordan, Canada’s Military Top Brass Joins CSIS in Demanding Huawei Ban,
WSWS (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/02/12/huaw-f12.html.
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Strategic Rivalry”—in which CSIS organized but did not participate.144 The
workshop and publication of papers by leading—though unnamed—experts
expressed many concerns regarding China’s influential role in the development
of technology and infrastructure that would, without doubt, penetrate and
compromise national security.145
The Canadian Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (CSTAC)
was established in 2010 in response to several National Strategies and Action
Plans for Critical Infrastructure that “called for government and industry
cooperation to ensure the security of Canada’s critical infrastructure.”146
CSTAC is comprised of five government members, including but not limited to,
Public Safety Canada, Cyber Centre, CSIS, and twelve industry members.147
CSTAC’s mission is to “improve the overall security” of the critical
infrastructure in Canadian telecom.148 CSTAC has released several guidance
and best practices papers, but none of these documents carry the force of law nor
any weight beyond being informal guidelines. Additionally, as indicated above,
none of the government members involved in this Committee have separately
regulated with the force of law on ICT supply chains.
Conservative Members of Parliament heavily criticize the lack of
governmental action, arguing that, as the only “Five Eyes [nation] to [] not take[]
action to mitigate the security risk of using Huawei[,]” this has been “an abject
failure on the Trudeau government’s part to protect [Canada’s] national
security,” by ultimately threatening the future of Canada’s privy to “intelligencesharing.”149 The leader of the Bloc Québecois argued Canada’s reluctance “to
ban Huawei” is likely an attempt “to avoid a further strain in relations with China
at a time when . . . Chinese trade sanctions” resulted after Canadian forces
arrested a Huawei executive officer.150 Links between Canada’s silence on
Huawei and political tensions between the two countries are well recognized,
with diplomatic sources claiming that “[i]f it weren’t for [the arrests], Canada
would have already said it would not be using Huawei 5G technology.”151

144. CANADIAN SEC. INTEL. SERV., CHINA AND THE AGE OF STRATEGIC RIVALRY:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM AN ACADEMIC OUTREACH WORKSHOP (2018).
145. Id. at 65–66, 110. One excerpt reads: CCP leader “Xi Jinping highlighted the country’s
ambition to transform itself into a ‘science and technology superpower[.]’” Id. at 125.
146. CAN. SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM. (CSTAC), SECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR
CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS (TSPS) 2 (2013).
147. Canadian Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee (CSTAC), (last visited Jan.
15, 2020), https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/h_sf10727.html.
148. CAN. SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 146, at 2.
149. Fife, et al., supra note 131.
150. Id. After Huawei executive Wanzhou was arrested on Canadian soil, Beijing responded
by arresting two Canadians and halting agricultural imports from Canada for the following months.
Id.
151. David Ljunggren, Canada has Effectively Moved to Block China’s Huawei from 5G, but
Can’t Say so, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-canada-
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Canada’s inaction is condemned by military officials, who argue allowing
Huawei “a role in 5G [will] threaten national security.”152 Public Safety
maintains, however, that Canada is closely working and communicating with its
Five Eyes partners “to ensure that its approach to strengthening critical
infrastructure resilience considers the global context and leverages best practices
from trusted allies.”153 Despite these assertions, as of July 2020, a cabinet
member stated privately that only one discussion on Huawei had occurred, and
nothing indicates Canada will be announcing a path soon.154
Many believe the delay in formalizing a decision has resulted in a de facto ban
from private networks and that eventually, Canada’s “absence of a solution will
[] settle all problems.”155 Because “do[ing] nothing” may allow Canada to avoid
being at the crossroads between the US and China, some commentators argue
this approach is strategic by upsetting neither country.156 Yet, merely choosing
not to adopt a policy as a strategy to upset neither country appears instead likely
ineffective, as it may lead the US to place pressure on Canada, thereafter causing
havoc for the latter’s relationship with China.
Illustrative of this pressure, on the one side, a former Chinese Ambassador to
Canada157 asserted, “[i]f the Canadian government does ban Huawei from
participating in the 5G network, then . . . there will be repercussions.”158 On the
other side, President Trump asserted, if “countries ‘want to do business with us,
they can’t use’ technology from Huawei.”159 U.S. members of Congress have
also threatened that intelligence sharing will come to a halt with any country that

huawei-analysis/canada-has-effectively-moved-to-block-chinas-huawei-from-5g-but-cant-say-soidUKKBN25L26S.
152. Stephen Wicary, Military wants Huawei Banned from 5G in Canada: Report, BNN
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/military-wants-huawei-banned-from5g-in-canada-report-1.1387769.
153. PUB. SAFETY CAN., 2018-2020 ACTION PLAN FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 4 (2018).
154. Fife, et al., supra note 131.
155. Jowitt, supra note 129. Exemplifying these effects, “two of the biggest Canadian mobile
operators – Bell Canada and Telus – signed up with Sweden’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia to
build 5G networks, dropping Huawei despite using its kit for their 4G networks.” Id.
156. Id.
157. See Keegan Elmer, China’s ‘Outspoken’ Lu Shaye Leaves Canada to Become
Ambassador to France, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 9, 2019, 11:00 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3022175/chinas-outspoken-lu-shaye-leavescanada-become-ambassador.
158. Zhou, supra note 133.
159. Fife et al., supra note 131. With a recent shift from the Trump to the Biden administration,
the question remains whether President Biden will adopt his predecessors’ approach. While still
the early days of Biden’s administration, executive efforts thus far remain largely consistent with
those under President Trump; some nuances nevertheless exist, such as broader efforts being taken
to adopt a more wholistic, comprehensive approach to supply chain security. See Justin Sherman,
The U.S. Is Continuing Its Campaign Against Huawei, LAWFARE (July 20, 2021, 11:58 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-continuing-its-campaign-against-huawei.
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uses Huawei technology.160 Given Canada’s role in the Five Eyes alliance,
permitting Huawei to remain in its 5G networks could prove extremely
challenging for the future of Canada’s intelligence-sharing relationship with the
US and, possibly, with the other Five Eyes countries.
Despite Canada’s ambiguous policy on ICT SCRM, private industry has
begun to shift away from Huawei of its own accord. In June 2020, two of
Canada’s largest telecom providers, Bell Canada and Telus Corp, announced
new 5G telecom deals with Ericsson and Nokia.161 Rogers Communications,
another “dominant [Canadian] telecoms operator” had “already partnered with
Ericsson.”162 These three providers account for a substantial portion of 5G
telecom contracts in Canada, and none of these contracts involve Huawei for the
future of 5G networks.
While the largest Canadian communications providers have shifted away from
Huawei, the Canadian government has not yet taken a concrete policy stance on
the future of Huawei equipment. Dominant telecommunications providers,
rather than government policy, appear to be the force behind the pressure for
Canadian providers to opt for non-Huawei products.
4. The European Union
“[D]edicated to achieving a high common level of cybersecurity across
Europe[,]” the European Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) was established in
2004.163 ENISA, “strengthened by the EU Cybersecurity Act[,] . . . contributes
to EU cyber policy, enhances the trustworthiness of ICT products, . . . [and]
cooperates with Member States and EU bodies.”164 In January 2020, ENISA
published the EU toolbox of risk-mitigating measures (“the Toolbox”).165 The

160. See Sean Keane, Huwaei Ban timeline: Detained CFO Makes Deal with the US Justice
Department, CNET (Sept. 30, 2021, 8:10 AM), https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-andsoftware/huawei-ban-timeline-detained-cfo-makes-deal-with-us-justice-department/; see also
Stephanie Condon, Senator Unveils Bill to Stop the US from Sharing Intel with Countries using
Huawei 5G, ZDNET (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/senator-unveils-bill-to-stop-theus-from-sharing-intel-with-countries-using-huawei-5g/ (discussing Senator Tom Cotton’s
proposed legislation to prohibit the U.S. from sharing intelligence with any country permitting
Huawei 5G equipment within its borders).
161. Moira Warburton & Neha Malara, Canadian telcos tap Ericsson, Nokia for 5G gear,
ditching Huawei, REUTERS (June 2, 2020, 3:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bellcanada-ericsson-5g/canadian-telcos-tap-ericsson-nokia-for-5g-gear-ditching-huaweiidUSKBN2391ZV.
162. Id.
163. About ENISA – The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/about-enisa (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
164. Id.
165. NIS Coop. Grp., Cybersecurity of 5G Networks EU Toolbox of Risk Mitigating Measures,
3, CG Pub. 01/2020 (Jan. 2020).
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Toolbox recommends member states either exclude or restrict high-risk vendors
from their core 5G networks.166
The Toolbox does not specify which entities qualify as high-risk vendors,
leaving the responsibility to member states to make this determination.167 Critics
of this approach argue that, while the EU identified the need to address cyber
security very early, it has allowed trading interests with China to prevail over
addressing identified security threats.168 The interplay between policy
development and concern for international trade is particularly apparent with
Germany, as Germany “is more dependent on foreign trade than many other EU
member states.”169
a. Germany
Germany has adopted regulations with the force of law that nominally
strengthen the security standards for companies in ICT infrastructures,170 but on
further examination, the regulations merely create a self-certification regime,
whereby suppliers, such as Huawei, declare their trustworthiness as a condition
of supplying products for use in German communications networks.171 While
recent reports have discussed proposals for tighter security legislation, for the
foreseeable future, the only requirement in force is minimal, and private industry
has little incentive to abstain from pursuing relationships and contracts with
Huawei.172
Adopting stronger requirements is further complicated by the opposing views
of the former German Chancellor and other government agencies. The former

166. Luke Baker & John Chalmers, As Britain bans Huawei, U.S. Pressure Mounts on Europe
to Follow Suit, REUTERS (July 14, 2020, 10:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britainhuawei-europe/as-britain-bans-huawei-u-s-pressure-mounts-on-europe-to-follow-suitidUSKCN24F1XG. In response to these recommendations, a EU senior diplomat stated that
member states raised concerns over these guidelines not reaching “far enough to limit dependence
on Huawei, and [that] the [Toolboox’s] distinction between ‘core’ . . . and ‘non-core’ was ‘not as
robust’ as” anticipated. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Daniel Leisegang, Knock, Knock! Huawei’s there, THE GER. TIMES (Mar. 2020),
http://www.german-times.com/knock-knock-huaweis-there/. With trade volumes amounting to
roughly 600 billion euros, trade levels of this magnitude influence the EU’s actions given the
Union’s tremendous interest in not “jeopardizing its relationship with [its] . . . economic partner[,]”
China. Id.
169. Id.
170. Council Directive 2015/1535, of September 17, 2015, Catalogue of Requirements in
Accordance with § 109(6), 2015 O.J. (L. 241) [hereinafter Catalogue].
171. Id. at § 3.
172. See Samuel Stolton, US Praises German Moves to Sideline Huawei from 5G Networks,
EURACTIV (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/us-praises-germanmoves-to-sideline-huawei-from-5g-networks/ (discussing reports surfacing regarding proposals for
a two-stage procedure for ensuring 5G network security, “involv[ing] technical tests of components
to be used in 5G infrastructure, alongside a ‘political assessment’ of the trustworthiness of
manufacturers”).
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Chancellor, Angela Merkel, advocated resisting the international and domestic
pressures to completely exclude Huawei, stating that even though issues and
concerns have “increased substantially,” they must “keep trying to find
solutions, even if it’s a millimeter at a time.”173 Merkel’s stance faces public
criticism from two major governmental bodies: the German intelligence
agencies, claiming Huawei’s “ties to the Chinese communist party pose a risk to
information security,”174 and the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Bundestag, claiming Germany must recognize Huawei’s security risks.175
Nevertheless, Merkel rejects a blanket ban in favor of “strict security
requirements that should be constantly reviewed.”176
The self-certification regime emanates from September 2020 action of the
telecommunications regulatory authority, the Bundesnetzagentur (“Federal
Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post, and Railway”
or “Federal Network Agency”),177 which issued a “[c]atalogue of security
requirements for operating of telecommunications and data processing systems”
in accordance with Section 109 of the Telecommunications Act.178 The
catalogue directs the Federal Network Agency, in consultation with the Federal
Office for Information Security, to create guidelines for networks and establish
“[a]dditional security requirements for network components with an increased
risk potential.”179 It also requires public telecom network operators and
providers to “appropriately select manufacturers and sellers or suppliers of
critical components before purchasing them[,]” and “obtain a comprehensive

173. Patrick Donahue, Merkel Resists Full Ban on Huawei, Making Germany an Outlier,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0922/merkel-resists-full-ban-on-huawei-making-germany-an-outlier.
174. Id.
175. Patrick Wintour, Europe Divided on Huawei as US Pressure to Drop Company Grows,
THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2020, 9:52 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/
jul/13/europe-divided-on-huawei-as-us-pressure-to-drop-company-grows.
176. Andrea Thomas, Bundesnetzagentur schließt Huawei nicht pauschal vom 5G-Ausbau aus
[The Federal Network Agency Does not Exclude Huawei from the 5G Expansion Across the Board],
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
(Aug.
11,
2020,
12:24
PM),
https://www.finan
znachrichten.de/nachrichten-2020-08/50419271-bundesnetzagentur-schliesst-huawei-nichtpauschal-vom-5g-ausbau-aus-015.htm&prev=search&pto=aue.
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
refusal to exclude any single company from the 5G expansion is shared by Peter Altmaier, the
Federal Minister of Economics. Id.
177. About the Bundesnetzagentur, https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/EN/General/Bundesnet
zagentur/About/AboutTheBundesnetzagentur_node.html (last visited Feb 11, 2022).
178. Catalogue, supra note 170, at § 2.
179. Id. at Annex 2. “The Catalogue of the Bundesnetzagentur has the status of ‘soft law,’
which means that it is an interpretation of binding statutory law by the Bundesnetzagentur . . . The
Bundesnetzagentur . . . mentioned that it can audit the security measures of [networks] affected[.]”
Sven-Erik Heun, et. al, New IT Security Requirements for Telecommunications Services and
Networks in Germany, BIRD & BIRD (Oct. 2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/
articles/2019/global/new-it-security-requirements-for-telecommunications-services-andnetworks-in-germany.
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declaration from the supply source to demonstrate its trustworthiness.”180 While
these requirements apply “across all networks and communications
infrastructure . . . [and] vendors[,]”181 it is criticized for “lack[ing] teeth”182
because its “forensic approach . . . [still] allows for companies like Huawei to
operate in the country.”183
Huawei publicly maintains that it will “‘continue to work transparently with
regulators, customers[,] and industry organizations’ to ‘ensure the security of
mobile networks.’”184 Germany’s Economic Minister met with Huawei’s CEO
and stated for the record “that [Germany] expect[s] all operators to fulfill . . .
security requirements and that it is now Huawei’s duty to show us that they are
able to do so.”185 Whether and how Germany enforces that duty remains to be
seen.
In late September 2020, reports surfaced regarding the government’s move
toward a new IT Security Act, “seeking to introduce new rules to ensure the
security of 5G networks, that would de facto amount to an ‘exclusion’ of
Huawei.”186 This new IT Security Act, the “IT-SiG 2.0,” aims to “clos[e] legal
loopholes and expand[] the existing regulatory framework [with an] . . .
overarching objective [] to enhance IT security standards by amending several
existing German laws.”187 To date, however, the legislation has not been
formally proposed, drawing criticism from German lawmakers.188 The bill, as
currently proposed, would create “bureaucratic obstacles that could prove
insurmountable” and effectively create “an outright ban on Huawei” as a

180. Catalogue, supra note 170, at § 3.
181. Jamie Davies, Germany Outlines its 5G Security Requirements, TELECOMS (Mar. 8, 2019,
10:44 AM), https://telecoms.com/496135/germany-outlines-its-5g-security-requirements/.
182. Laurens Cerulus, Why Germany’s Huawei Move Irks More than just Washington,
POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-defies-us-onhuawei/. The President of the Federal Network Agency, Jochen Homann, argues “exclud[ing
Huawei] from the market . . . would delay the roll-out of 5G networks.” Germany Pressures
Huawei to mMet Security Requirements, DW (June 21, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/germanypressures-huawei-to-meet-security-requirements/a-49294841.
183. Davies, supra note 181.
184. Thomas, supra note 176.
185. DW, supra note 182.
186. Stolton, supra note 172.
187. Dr. Detlev Gabel, Germany’s Draft Bill on IT Security 2.0 – Extended BSI Authorities,
Stricter Penalties and New Obligations on Providers, WHITE & CASE (July 12, 2019),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/germanys-draft-bill-it-security-20-extended-bsiauthorities-stricter-penalties. Several German laws are expected to be amended, including: the Act
on the German Federal Office for Information Security, the German Telecommunications Act, the
German Telemedia Act, and the German Criminal Code. Id.
188. See Laurens Cerulus, Deutsche Telekom Ender Pressure After Reports on Huawei
Reliance, POLITICO (July 8, 2020, 10:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/08/
deutsche-telekom-huawei-5g-352317.
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supplier.189 Specifically, the bill introduces a two-stage approval process for
permissible operations of certain telecom equipment: first, “a technical check of
individual components[,]” and second, “a political assessment of the
manufacturer’s ‘trustworthiness.’”190
Germany is heavily dependent on Huawei as it “provides about 45% of
Germany’s 4G base stations and [remains] a leading supplier to phone
companies.”191 This includes Deutsche Telekom, in which the German
government “holds a 14.5-percent stake.”192 Deutsche Telekom—a global
telecom giant based in Germany—contracted with Huawei in 2019, claiming the
company was a “strategic partner.”193 The two companies agreed that Huawei
would “shoulder the burdens and costs of U.S. security measures taken.”194
Many within the German Parliament expressed concern over these deals,
arguing it problematic if “there is indeed a high degree of dependence of
[Deutsche] Telekom on Huawei in expanding the 5G network.”195 Despite
Deutsche Telekom’s willingness to engage with Huawei, Germany’s head of
foreign intelligence maintains that Huawei “cannot be trusted and should not
play a major role” in 5G networks.196
Germany’s approach to Huawei is nuanced and divided. While rumors remain
that Germany could be headed to adopting legislation to exclude Huawei, it
appears that full collaboration with Huawei continues with both government and
private sectors.
b. Italy
Italy has adopted ICT SCRM regulation with the force of law that requires
network operators to take greater security measures and assigns the government
“special powers” to impose conditions on transactions deemed threatening to

189. Guy Chazan & Nic Fildes, Germany Crackdown set to Exclude Huawei from 5G Rollout,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/35197477-acef-4429-a1d871743ee8d8e3.
190. Id. “In its current form [the bill] envisages that when doubts arise as to a company’s
trustworthiness then the government can investigate it, using information provided by the
intelligence services.” Id. (alterations in original).
191. DW, supra note 182.
192. Laurens Cerulus, How U.S. Restrictions Drove Deutsche Telekom and Huawei Closer
Together, POLITICO (July 7, 2020, 6:09 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/07/
deutsche-telekom-huawei-us-restrictions-350252.
193. Id. Despite the purported partnership between Huawei and Deutsche Telekom, before
any German bill was finalized, the latter company voluntarily began shifting “away from using
Huawei systems in the ‘core’ – the intelligence part of the network where customer information is
processed.” Chazan & Fildes, supra note 189.
194. Cerulus, supra note 188.
195. Id.
196. Baker & Chalmers, supra 166.
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national defense and homeland security.197 To date, however, there has been no
action to explicitly exclude Huawei. Rather, Italy’s regulatory requirements
include vulnerability assessments of companies operating in the
communications and technology sectors.198 Despite this governmental
approach, actions of the private industry beckon a shift away from contracting
with Huawei for 5G deals.
“Italy is the second largest market for Huawei smartphones,”199 contributing
to robust Italian-Huawei relations.200 For example, in responding to Italy’s
economic struggles amidst COVID-19, Huawei’s Chief Representative to the
European Institutions remarked, “[m]ore than ever, Huawei is committed to its
presence in Italy and their digital transformation. 5G [is] key to shaping Italy’s
economic viability.”201 Correspondingly, in April 2019, Italian Prime Minister
Giuseppe Conte assured CEO Zhengfei that Huawei “would not face
discrimination in the rollout of Italy’s 5G telecoms network.”202
The Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic, in a public
opinion, recommended the government consider preventing specific companies,
such as Huawei, from participating in Italy’s 5G networks.203 The Committee
stated that excluding particular “companies from the activity of supplying
technology for 5G networks” was an appropriate mechanism.204 By contrast,

197. Baker McKenzie, el al., The National Cyber Security Perimeter – Italy’s Approach to
Protecting its Key Communications Infrastructure and Services, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=169c334b-3e21-40c6-84e2-7105df4cc57c.
198. See Italy: New Provisions on National Cybersecurity Enter into Force, LIBR. CONG. L.
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/italy-new-provisions-on-nationalcybersecurity-enter-into-force/. These new vulnerability factors, designed to guarantee high levels
of network security, “include (a) security policies related to organizational structures and risk
management, (b) mitigation and management of accidents and their prevention, (c) physical safety
and data protection, (d) integrity of networks and information systems, (e) monitoring, testing and
control, and (f) training and awareness.” Id.
199. Giovanna De Maio, Playing with Fire: Italy, China, and Europe, BROOKINGS INSTIT. 9
(2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/FP_20200519_playing_with_fire.pdf.
200. See Press Release, Side by Side with Italy Following Pandemic, HUAWEI (June 25, 2020),
https://www.huawei.eu/press-release/side-side-italy-following-pandemic.
201. Id. Huawei’s remarks focused heavily on the economic effects Italy faced during the
COVID pandemic, and how its 5G technologies could support Italy’s economic recovery. Id.
202. Mark Bendeich, Italian PM Assures Huawei it Won’t Face Discrimination, REUTERS
(Apr. 26, 2019, 11:39AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-huawei-conte/italian-pmassures-huawei-it-wont-face-discrimination-idUSKCN1S21R7.
203. Pierluigi Paganini, Negative Opinion of Italy Security Committee Copasir on Huawei,
ZTE 5G Solutions, SEC. AFF. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/95424/
security/copasir-huawei-ztes.html.
204. Id.
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the Italian Minister for Industry urges Huawei should “be allowed to play a role
in the development of the country’s 5G network[s].”205
“In November 2019, [Italy] passed law No. 133/2019 (Law 133), which
establishe[d] the[] ‘National Cyber Security Perimeter’ [the “Perimeter”] and
amend[ed] the Italian legislation on foreign investments in certain strategic
sectors.”206 The goal of Law 133 is ensuring high security for “networks,
information systems, and IT services . . . whose failure may harm national
security.”207 When establishing the Perimeter, the government must first
identify those entities or administrations that are subject to specific security
obligations, and second, impose on them duties to notify the Government about
any incident affecting such networks.208 Non-compliance would trigger
significant fines and, in some instances, imprisonment.209 Law 133 also includes
a “special powers” amendment, enabling the Government “to impose conditions
on . . . certain transactions” in “critical hi-tech infrastructures and 5G
technologies” whenever the Government finds the transactions “would result in
a threat of serious harm to Italian public interests.”210
Under the special powers provision, “broadband electronic communication
services based on 5G technology” must “notify all 5G-related contracts to the
Government, in order for the [government] to assess whether [they must] impose
conditions.”211
In addition to Law 133, in September 2019, the Italian government
promulgated Decree Law No. 105 (Decree 105), which contains “urgent
provisions on national cybersecurity” with purposes “to guarantee the highest
level of security for networks . . . and information technology (IT) services.”212
Decrees are passed by Italian governments in cases of necessity and urgency,
which enable the government to adopt “provisional measures having the force
of law.”213 Decree 105 states that “regulations must provide for an assessment
of vulnerability factors that could compromise the integrity and security of the
networks and data of networks with 5G technology.”214

205. Matei Rosca, Italian Industry Minister Calls for Huawei Access to 5G Network, POLITICO
(Dec. 22, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/italian-industry-minister-calls-forhuawei-access-to-5g-network/.
206. Baker McKenzie, et al., supra note 197.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. LIB. CONG. L., supra note 198.
213. Marco Gubitosi, et al., Legal Systems in Italy: Overview, THOMAS REUTERS PRACTICAL
LAW,https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-007-7826?transitionType=Default&context
Data=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true.
214. LIBR. CONG. L., supra note 198.
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In the same vein, Law No. 23 (or the “Golden Power Law”) was recently
expanded to increase screening requirements of various sectors, including
communications,215 in order to offer protections for foreign investments in
Italian assets.216 The Golden Power Law grants the Italian government
jurisdiction to review any transaction in the “defense and national security
sectors, which may harm or constitute a material threat to the Italian
government’s essential interests[,]” and in the “communication and high-tech
sectors, which may harm or constitute a material threat to the fundamental
interests of Italy.”217 Despite its expanded scope, applying this law “is
ultimately a matter for political discretion[,]” as Italy does not have “an
independent committee to take screening decisions.”218
In July 2020, Italy’s largest telecom provider, Telecom Italia (TIM), excluded
Huawei from a tender bidding for 5G equipment for the core network it was
building in Italy and Brazil.219 TIM stated this omission was done “as ‘part of
[it’s] suppliers’ diversification policy.’”220 The invited suppliers included
Ericsson, Nokia, and Cisco.221 Despite its exclusion, the chairman of Huawei’s
Italian operation claims Huawei is still working with TIM, qualifying their
exclusion as merely “a ‘commercial’ decision, unlike in Britain where he said
the Chinese telecoms group’s exclusion from 5G services was a ‘geopolitical,
not a technological decision.’”222

215. Maio, supra note 199 at 10–11.
216. Ferigo Foscari, et al, COVID-19 – Italy Expands Golden Power Review of Foreign
Investments, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/covid19-italy-expands-golden-power-review-foreign-investments.
217. Id. To the extent non-EU persons are involved in transactions, the law grants jurisdiction
over “the execution of any agreement relating to the acquisition of assets or services relating to 5G
technology infrastructure (or any 5G technology related components).” Id.
218. Maio, supra note 199 at 11. Based on documentation made publicly available by the
Italian government, only twenty-six known procedures have been exercised under the special
powers’ reviews regarding the subjects of defense, national security, communications, and 5G
technologies. Ferigo Foscari, et al., Foreign Direct Investment Reviews 2020: A Global Perspective
– Italy, WHITE & CASE (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/foreign-directinvestment-reviews-2020-44968/. So far these include measures such as approval of safety
contingency plans to “monitor strategic assets and operations,” monitoring measures such as
“independent committees tasked with the duty to monitor” compliance with measures imposed by
Italian government, and other technical measures aimed at “preserving the confidentiality of
information and the technological know-how of the target.” Id.
219. Elvira Pollina, Exclusive: TIM Excludes Huawei from 5G Core Equipment Tender,
REUTERS (July 9, 2020, 10:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-5g-italybrazil-exclusive/exclusive-tim-excludes-huawei-from-5g-core-equipment-tenderidUSKBN24A2AE.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Reuters, Huawei Says It’s Working With Telecom Italia Despite 5G Exclusion: Paper,
U.S. NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2020-0720/huawei-italy-executive-says-tim-decision-not-political-newspaper.
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Overall, although Italy has not officially excluded Huawei, Italy’s actions
have shifted toward heightened security standards for 5G technological
equipment contracts that equip the government with powers capable of imposing
conditions on transactions deemed threatening to Italy’s security. These
standards have reached the point of affecting private industries, as the leading
provider TIM has seemingly reacted by excluding Huawei from 5G deals, even
though government policy does not officially exclude Huawei equipment from
networks.
III. CATEGORIZING THE FIVE NATIONS INTO THREE GROUPS BASED ON
SHARED CHARACTERISTICS
Although each nation’s supply chain risk mitigation policies are distinct, each
nation fits into one of three approaches, categorically including: legislation
excluding Huawei, legislation not excluding Huawei, and an absence of
legislation addressing supply chain security. Grouping nations based on these
categorical approaches helps shed light on the effects international and domestic
factors have on the development of ICT SCRM policies.
A. Group One – ICT SCRM Legislation, Completely Exclude Huawei
Countries in Group One, comprised of the US and the UK, have adopted a
policy that prohibits Huawei equipment in developing 5G networks. This group
exhibits three primary characteristics. First, there is a whole of government
approach toward developing policy and law to mitigate ICT supply chain risks.
Second, adopted—or imminently expected to be adopted—policy with the force
of law targets Huawei explicitly and restricts the use of its equipment in 5G
infrastructures. Finally, against tense political overlays, Group One nations
adopt firm and stringent international policies toward China.
Policy approaches that are adopted by a “whole of government” strategy
facilitate relatively quick passing of legislation and regulation.223 For example,
both the US and UK’s whole of government approaches have led to,
respectively, promulgation and expected promulgation of legislation and
regulation prohibiting or restricting Huawei. Through several government
agencies’ efforts, the US achieved significant prohibitions on Huawei equipment
and continues to undergo policy refinements. One example of this achievement
is demonstrated by the regulatory agency, FCC.224 The FCC is currently
implementing a policy that calls for the complete removal and replacement of
Huawei equipment purchased with USF subsidies, which tend to involve smaller
providers in more rural areas.225 Similarly, the U.K.’s planned legislative efforts

223. Phillips, et al., supra note 99 (discussing the U.S. “whole of government” approach to
creating Huawei policy).
224. See discussion infra Section II.A.1.b.
225. SECOND REPORT AND ORDER, supra note 85, at 1, 10–11.
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empower its regulatory agency to place conditions on providers regarding which
entities are allowed in 5G contracts.226
The US, through its executive branch, is treating Huawei as “an unusual and
extraordinary threat to . . . national security.”227 Pursuant to an executive order,
executive branch agencies, under their delegated authorities, are pursuing
policies to secure ICT supply chains.228 In addition to these executive and
regulatory actions, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation explicitly excluding
executive agencies from contracting with Huawei for any purpose.229 Thus,
through congressional as well as regulatory and executive action, the
government has comprehensively restricted Huawei’s presence.
In a similar vein, the U.K.’s Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, stated his intent
to remove Huawei equipment from U.K. systems by 2027.230 These plans echo
the US’s removal and replacement policies. Additionally, they demonstrate the
UK’s collaborative whole of government approach to securing ICT supply
chains, given that both the head of government plans for Huawei’s exclusion and
legislative efforts to exclude Huawei are complementary.231
US and UK laws, either expected or currently in force, demonstrate zero
tolerance for Huawei equipment. These policy efforts also shed light on the
influence government action can have on private providers, even absent direct
regulation on private providers. For example, although the UK presently has no
enforceable law regulating Huawei equipment, a U.K. mobile operator
nevertheless voluntarily decided not to contract with Huawei for its 5G
technology.232 Thus, even absent enacted law, the UK has arguably reached the
point where private providers are wary of contracting with Huawei. Considering
the passage of the US’s NDAA FY21, US providers will also likely exercise
similar caution, especially given the advent of Open RAN technology and the
possibility of federally funded grants to support this choice of technology.233 In
turn, this development will likely result in the private industry’s voluntary
exclusion of Huawei in the US.
The impact of delicate political situations involving Chinese relations with
both the US and UK have arguably impacted ICT SCRM policies. In the US,
the former Trump Administration adopted a series of tough trade policies on
China and Chinese companies in several sectors, including

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

DEP’T FOR DIGIT., CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, supra note 100, at 6–7.
Exec. Order No. 13873, supra note 56, at 22689.
Id. at 22690; discussion infra II.A.1.
See discussion infra II.A.1.a.
Seidel, supra note 106.
See id.
Devanesan, supra note 128.
See NDAA FY21, supra note 91, at § 9202(a)(1)(C)(ii).
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telecommunications.234 Similarly, there is evidence that the U.K.’s shift toward
stricter Huawei policy was prompted by the political changes brought by US
actions regarding Huawei.235 On top of this, though it is difficult to prove a
direct linkage, the UK’s policy shift toward restricting Huawei aligns temporally
with the escalating tensions between China and the UK regarding political and
economic freedom in Hong Kong.236
In summary, Group One’s policies are effectuated through a whole of
government approach because various members and sectors of the governments
agree on the broad policy approach to restricting Huawei’s presence. The
political overlay of each nation has led to the adoption of stringent policies
mitigating Chinese-related threats. As a result, ICT supply chain legislation—
either promulgated or expected—would exclude Huawei equipment from 5G
infrastructures.
B. Group Two—ICT SCRM Legislation, No Official Exclusion on Huawei
Countries in Group Two, comprised of Italy and Germany, have no official
policy excluding Huawei. The countries exhibit three primary characteristics.
First, unlike the whole of government approach in Group One, the positions
advanced by government agencies and officials are inconsistent regarding the
appropriate role for Huawei.237 Second, ICT SCRM methodologies are
composed of vetting processes to certify trustworthiness and operability in
networks.238 Finally, unlike Group One where the overlay of political climates
encourages them to adopt tougher policies, Group Two nations’ political
overlays discourage the nations from being overly tough towards China.239
Thus, they have not yet, nor do they appear likely to in the future, pursue policy
explicitly excluding Huawei.
Discordant approaches regarding the proper role for Huawei are exhibited by
contrasting statements issued by the former German head of government,
Merkel, and the German head of foreign intelligence. Merkel’s statements
emphasize that, although Germany has no intention of excluding Huawei from
their networks, they instead aim to find alternative ways to assure adequate
supply chain security.240 Contrastingly, the head of intelligence emphasizes that
234. See Hass & Denmark, supra note 60 (discussing the “war on trade” with China); see
Macias, supra note 61 (discussing how former President Trump urged nations to hold China
accountable for the Coronavirus pandemic).
235. Gold, supra note 108 (explaining that United Kingdom’s Digital and Culture Minister,
Oliver Dowden, stated the new U.S. sanctions imposed on Huawei “significantly changed” the
landscape, such that the “UK [could] no longer be confident” that Huawei equipment could supply
its 5G equipment.)
236. See Yip, supra note 111.
237. See infra Sections II.A.4.a–b.
238. See infra Sections II.A.4.a–b.
239. See infra Sections II.A.4.a–b.
240. Donahue, supra note 173.
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Huawei definitively “cannot be trusted” nor “should [it] play a major role” in
Germany’s networks.241
This tension between the leaders within the German government parallels that
within Italy. On the one hand, both the Italian Prime Minister and Italian
Minister for Industry are on record as not supporting the singling out of Huawei,
242
and that instead, Huawei should “be allowed to play a role in” Italian 5G
networks.243 On the other hand, the Parliamentary Committee for the Security
of the Republic is on record saying the opposite, specifically that certain
companies, such as Huawei, should be excluded from “supplying technology for
5G networks.”244
Without more congruity of viewpoints among government actors regarding
the extent to which 5G deployment is linked to national security policy and the
level of threat posed by Huawei, it seems unlikely that ICT SCRM policies in
Germany and Italy will develop to the point of singling out and excluding any
particular entity. This prediction is reflected through legislation and regulations
adopted by both Italy and Germany that take incremental, bureaucratic
approaches.
Germany has moved toward adopting IT-SiG 2.0, which would create a
regulatory framework in German law designed to ensure 5G network security.245
This bill’s proposal to require both a technical check and a political
assessment246 contrasts with the approach taken by the Federal Network
Agency’s catalogue, which requires providers to obtain a supply source’s selfdeclaration of trustworthiness.247 Even though neither of these approaches
excludes, or even restricts, Huawei, the contrast between these views
demonstrates the increasing tensions within the government regarding the lack
of a unified approach, blocking the path for a cohesive national strategy. In fact,
the two approaches would likely yield opposite results. On the one hand, under
the proposal envisaged by IT-SiG 2.0, Huawei would likely be de facto banned,
assuming it were to fail either technical or political assessment. On the other
hand, under the catalogue, Huawei would likely be permitted in intrastate
networks, assuming it were to simply declare itself trustworthy. Because
different approaches could produce vastly different results for the future of
Huawei, it seems problematic that there is a lack of unity among the critical
proposals.
Similarly, differing views and tension exist within the Italian government.
Italian laws have addressed government vetting of 5G-related contracts,248 new
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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vulnerability factor assessments for supply sources,249 and governmental review
of national security-related transactions.250 These legal efforts demonstrate the
government’s expansion of ICT SCRM policy framework, but they also
demonstrate the lack of a unified approach. This finding is demonstrated
through assigning vague powers and vulnerability factor assessments in policy,
rather than including any controversial language or naming specific entities, as
the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic would seemingly
prefer.251
Arguably, both Italy and Germany are giving greater credence to economic
factors in dealing with Huawei than the US or UK. Huawei’s smartphone market
in Italy252 and commitment to supporting Italy’s 5G deployment have generated
Italian dependence on Huawei products.253 This resulting reluctance to take a
harsher stance in its relationship with China reflects in its approach toward
Huawei. Similarly, Germany is already heavily dependent on Huawei products
in its 4G network254 and on China for much of its foreign trade.255 Thus, any
effort to adopt regulation or law targeting Huawei poses a significant economic
challenge, more significant than in the US or UK.
C. Group Three—No Official Action on ICT SCRM, No Official Stance
Group Three is comprised of Canada, which has not developed an ICT supply
chain policy.
Despite criticism for not affirmatively choosing a policy direction on
Huawei,256 Canada has remained silent regarding whether it will develop or
integrate ICT SCRM policies.257 Unlike Group Two’s internal political tensions,
Group Three is beset with external pressure from two superpowers to adopt
policy regulating Huawei’s role in 5G technologies. China has threatened
Canada that if Canada adopts any version of a ban on Huawei, Canada will face
“repercussions.”258 Canada likely views such threats as significant, given that
China retaliated against Canada when Canada acted against China’s best
interests.259 Meanwhile, the US’s threats to revoke business deals with Canada

249. See LIBR. CONG. L., supra note 198.
250. See Foscari, et. al, supra note 216.
251. See id. (demonstrating the vague powers and factor assessments).
252. See Maio, supra note 199, at 9.
253. See HUAWEI, supra note 200.
254. Cerulus, supra note 182 (explaining that Huawei equipment comprises 45% of Germany’s
4G base stations).
255. See Leisegang, supra note 168.
256. See Wicary, supra note 152.
257. See Fife, et al., supra note 131.
258. Zhou, supra note 133.
259. See Ljunggren, supra note 151 (explaining that after Canada arrested a Huawei executive
on its soil, Canada retaliated against the nation by arresting two Canadians in China, and halting
Canada’s agricultural imports to China).
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if it does not agree to exclude Huawei from its networks are also significant. Of
all five countries examined, Canada’s posture appears to be influenced by
external political threats rather than internal national security or economic
concerns.260
Faced with this dilemma, Canada is unwilling to take action to signal a
direction. Absent a supervening event—such as the discovery of a major
security breach attributed to Huawei and/or the Chinese government directly—
Canada seems unlikely to move forward anytime soon on ICT SCRM.
D. Implications for the Future – Is There Another Way?
Although governments have adopted different ICT SCRM policies, generally,
and different approaches to Huawei, specifically, private industry has begun to
voluntarily shift away from Huawei. Arguably, this shift is motivated by (1) a
sense that restrictions on Huawei are imminent, and (2) presently enforceable
restrictions on Huawei equipment, which at least in the case of the US, are
augmented by the appropriation of funds to remove Huawei equipment and
develop instead, Open RAN technology. For example, a provider based in a
Group One country, Vodafone, officially announced its decision to find
alternatives to Huawei equipment, turning instead to Open RAN technology.261
Similarly, a provider under Group Two, Telecom Italia, excluded Huawei from
participating in its 5G tender deals.262 Group Three’s most dominant providers,
Bell, Telus, and Rogers Communications, likewise announced a partnership
with Ericsson and/or Nokia for their 5G networks.263 Across all three groups,
private industry is increasingly finding that it is in their interest to find ways to
deploy 5G without—or at least greatly reduced—influence from Huawei.
Action by the private industry may be needed to result in effective and
efficient exclusions of Huawei from 5G networks. Although some governments
have decided to exclude Huawei in 5G networks, the results may not be seen
until as late as 2027,264 with some partial expenses estimated at $1.6 billion.265
The financial cost and logistical speed with which the government can
implement restrictions on Huawei are, respectively, enormous and slow.
If international providers place heavier emphasis on developing and adopting
Open RAN measures, then private industry action offers not only a quicker
avenue to excluding Huawei than legislation is capable but also a necessary
avenue. This result is because many government actions are incapable of

260. Fife, et al., supra note 131.
261. Devanesan, supra note 128; see also discussion infra Section II.A.1 (discussing how
similarly, U.S. providers AT&T and Verizon, pursuant to pressure imposed by various members of
Congress, withdrew from previous agreements to contract with Huawei for 5G smartphones).
262. Pollina, supra note 219.
263. Warburton & Malara, supra note 161.
264. Seidel, supra note 106.
265. James, supra note 86.
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completely regulating private industries’ purchases, and even where they do,
such regulations are bogged down by arduous and lengthy processes.
CONCLUSION
As network providers move forward with acquiring cost-effective and highquality 5G equipment, the attractiveness of Huawei equipment has pushed
countries to address issues involving ICT SCRM. Several nations have adopted
distinct approaches to mitigating ICT supply chain threats. Five of these nations
are selected from the Fourteen Eyes allied nations and are discussed in detail
regarding their respective methodologies. The US, UK, Canada, Italy, and
Germany all have distinct policies, but the policies nevertheless illustrate three
general ICT SCRM approaches regarding Huawei. Nations have (1)
promulgated law excluding Huawei, (2) promulgated law improving security
measures but not explicitly excluding Huawei, or (3) undertaken no efforts to
promulgate ICT SCRM policy.
Domestic policies are influenced by a variety of factors. These aspects
include whether the entirety of the government agrees on the proper role for
Huawei and whether political climates encourage nations to develop tough
stances on China. These factors have influenced the five nations, in varying
ways, and have resulted in the three general approaches toward ICT SCRM
policy. The US and UK have promulgated, or are expected to promulgate, bans
on Huawei with the force of law. Italy and Germany have promulgated
generalized security standards with the force of law that does not explicitly ban
Huawei. Finally, Canada has not adopted any ICT SCRM measures, nor has
implied plans to do so, indicating the desired role for Huawei in its 5G networks.
Regardless of which general approach governments fall within, the private
sector within each of the examined groups has begun to assume an increasingly
significant role for the future of reducing supply chain risk. Across the nations,
private providers have begun shifting away from Huawei equipment in new 5G
deals, opting instead for alternative vendors or technologies. This shift in the
private industry suggests that private action may have more of an immediate
influence on Huawei’s future than any governmental action.
As ICT security threats continue to evolve, nations must frequently reassess
the proper prioritization of national security concerns against the quick
deployment of 5G technology. Presently, Huawei poses the most significant
threat to ICT SCRM, and companies and nations have thus focused on defining
its appropriate role. Yet, as new threats develop, nations will continue to find
themselves considering whether other Chinese entities offer trustworthy
equipment given that “there is nearly zero daylight [existing] between the
communist government of China and its ‘companies.’”266 Whether it be
governments or private industries leading the way, various international efforts
are beginning to pave the path for an alternative to Huawei.
266. STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O’RIELLY, supra note 1.
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